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PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SYSTEMIC INEQUALITY
Martha T. McCluskey
mcclusk@buffalo.edu
I.

Personal responsibility as a rationale for inequality
‘Equality ha[s] come and gone as a social idea with traction, even among liberal

intellectuals,’ concludes the American historian Daniel T Rodgers.1 In this chapter I
argue that equality’s undoing follows from an economic ideology of law that grounds
justice in an illusory divide between individual agency and collective support.
If equality means gaining from government protection rather than from
individual production, then equality will appear to come at the cost of responsible
action. This conceptual bind operates through two strands of personal responsibility
arguments. The first, perhaps more familiar version, legitimates inequality by attributing
it to individual failure. In recent global austerity politics, a second theory of personal
responsibility legitimates inequality and insecurity even while attributing these harms to
systemic failures far beyond individual control.

A. Personal responsibility for inequality within individual control
Welfare reform efforts in the United States embraced the first strand of
argument in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996. A prominent rationale for that legislation was that the former national welfare
program of income support for impoverished single mothers caused more women to
become impoverished single mothers, in a cycle of dependency or moral hazard that
1

Daniel T Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Harvard UP 2011) 271.
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effectively rewarded women for bearing and raising children without an employed
husband or without sufficient earnings of their own. The reform legislation increased
penalties and benefit restrictions in order to induce impoverished parents to seek wage
work or marriage or to delay or forgo bearing (or raising) children.
This legislation follows a long tradition of limiting government economic
protection to those deemed ‘deserving’ because of problems beyond their individual
control.2 Loss of income resulting from natural disasters, illness or physical disability,
or overt discrimination based on irrelevant, immutable characteristics has sometimes
(but not always) served to absolve those affected from individual responsibility for their
injuries. Liberal defenders of welfare and regulatory protections often justify egalitarian
policies by taking an expansive view of such constraints on individual autonomy,
arguing (for instance) that single mothers in poverty often lack sufficient education or
health to secure work or wage-earning husbands, or that they lack the social or
economic resources to avoid pregnancy.
Yet even with substantial evidence of such barriers to individual economic
success, these arguments for welfare support confront a bind. To deserve government
aid, one must risk assuming status as essentially undeserving. If individual autonomy is
an essential attribute of responsible legal and economic citizenship, then those who
deserve protection due to lack of autonomy will also risk appearing incapable of
responsible power in government and market. Within this framework, those deemed
incapable of autonomy are more likely to deserve government constraint or punishment
than support, through policies of surveillance, policing, incarceration or structural
adjustment.
2

cf Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American
Welfare State (Univ of Chicago 2012) .
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B. Personal responsibility for inequality beyond individual control
Further tightening this bind on egalitarian economic policy, the idea of
‘personal responsibility’ is being re-tooled to reach harms deemed largely beyond
personal control. The economic crisis that surfaced in 2008 left broad and deep
devastation around the globe. The resulting widespread austerity and instability does not
lend itself as readily to the standard theory turning economic inequality into a problem
of lack of capacity for responsible choice by particularly deviant groups.
Accordingly, the financial crisis raised hopes among some that faltering welfare
and regulatory state programs might be shored up by a fresh understanding that
systemic problems beyond individual control are a major source of economic loss.
Nonetheless, these hopes have been eclipsed by a powerful counter narrative. This story
concludes that even though most are blameless for their injuries, this pervasive
vulnerability to structural failure is best alleviated by further ensuring that the resulting
losses are borne privately and unequally. General austerity is good for both individuals
and society, in this chastened view, not so much because it encourages beneficial
change (in either individual behaviour or structural conditions) but because it avoids
wasting resources on futile or harmful attempts to change inevitable scarcity.
This newly updated ‘personal responsibility’ theme presents systemic unequal
harm as an inevitable feature of law and economy, thereby legitimating the message that
the best response to systemic suffering is unequal personal surrender rather than
collective resistance. Yielding to exploitative power can be turned into an expression of
free and powerful personal agency – responsible autonomy– when that unequal power is
constructed as natural, benign, or inevitable.

4
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To resist this narrative construing responsible agency as individual submission
to systemic deprivation, we must challenge the liberal vision of law and economy that
idealizes individual independent agency as the essence of responsible power. Sociolegal theorist Martha Fineman offers a model that replaces the liberal ideal of autonomy
with a fundamental premise of universal human vulnerability.3 Meaningful power, in
this view, necessarily and normally operates through collective action and institutions
aimed at supporting and protecting resilience in the face of this vulnerability. The liberal
ideal of personal autonomy reflects a disembodied illusion of agency and autonomy that
masks the ubiquitous (yet unequal) collective protections and support (in family,
society, state and market) on which all individual power inevitably depends.4 Further,
the liberal ideal of personal responsibility tends to undermine responsible agency among
those most privileged by collective support, by absolving from accountability those
whose personal power operates through control of seemingly impersonal, natural or
transcendent systems and institutions such as markets, corporations or states. To change
this picture, collective support and protection against systemic harm should be
understood as a normal and pervasive expression of legal and economic agency, central
rather than opposed to individual autonomy, responsibility and power.

II.

Personal Responsibility for the Financial Crisis in the United States

A. Solving Systemic Failure with Individual Sacrifice
As the 2008 financial crisis unfolded into economic recession, US political
parties sharpened a message of personal responsibility to cut government support for
social spending and regulation despite harm to those without blame or control.
Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ (2010) 60 Emory L J
251.
4
cf Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New Press 2004).
3
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Explaining his 2012 proposal to cut popular domestic programs such as home heating
aid for the elderly and funds for reducing toxic exhaust on school buses,5 President
Obama explained that his budget required ‘cutting things that I care deeply about’.6 In
order to rebuild the economy ‘from the worst recession in decades’, Obama emphasized
that these cuts were the ‘responsible approach’, though likely to undermine beneficial
goals: ‘as so many American families must do every day, [this budget] makes tough
choices on things we can't afford’.7
Republicans in the House of Representatives countered by proposing deeper and
broader cuts, such as reductions in unemployment benefits, Medicare’s health care
coverage for elderly people, veterans’ programs,8 and an anti-malarial program that had
helped slash mortality among young children in Senegal by one third in just three
years.9 Both major parties have helped to implement severe cuts in state and local
government spending, especially targeting children’s health and education.10 Instead of
moral and political outrage at this plunder11 of protections widely judged beneficial and
deserved, the strongest political challenge to these U.S. policies came from those who
insisted austerity measures should cut even further into Medicare and Social Security.
These bipartisan austerity efforts treat loss and insecurity as a widespread,
pervasive fact of the contemporary economy. In the past few decades, critics of
government welfare and regulation have tended to portray economic loss as exceptional,

Ron Scherer, ‘Among Obama’s Tough Budget Cuts: Money to Help Needy Pay for Heat’ Christian
Science Monitor (New York, 2 February 2011); Elizabeth Shogren, ‘Obama Budget Slashes Clean Diesel
Program’ National Public Radio (Washington DC, 16 February 2011)..
6
Office of Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Remarks by the President on Unveiling of the Budget in
Baltimore, Maryland’ (Washington DC, 14 February 2011).
7
Obama for America, ‘President Obama’s 2012 Budget’
<https://my.barackobama.com/page/content/president-obamas-2012-budget> accessed 1 January 2015.
8
Jean Sahadi, ‘Where GOP Budget Would Bite’ CNN Money (New York, 5 April 2011).
9
Michael Gerson, ‘The GOP’s Door of No Return’ Washington Post (15 February 2011).
10
Paul Krugman, ‘Leaving Children Behind’ NY Times (New York, 28 February 2011) A23.
11
cf Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal (Wiley-Blackwell 2008).
5
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characterized by particular problems of incapacity, deviance, or maladaptation.
Similarly, scapegoating of groups such as immigrants, racial minorities, low-income
families, and unionized public employees helps fuel recent austerity politics.
Nonetheless, the recent surge of energy for cutting social spending and regulatory
protections draws much of its power from seemingly gentler arguments.
Addressing state budget austerity, for example, a conservative blogger explained
that widespread job loss and debt has left the average American feeling ‘hopeless and
helpless’.12 He nonetheless insisted that ‘personal responsibility’ is the answer, not
because he blamed particular groups or behaviours for these problems, but because he
claimed that such blaming takes away individual power from those who are innocent.
No matter what the cause of the harm, he explained, we should not give in to thinking
anyone, especially government, can better solve the problems better than ourselves.
Spending cuts in South Carolina, for instance, are leaving parents wondering, ‘What can
I do about the budget crisis that will reduce my child's education, force teachers (who
get paid not enough now) to pay for supplies out of their own pockets, and cut teachers
and administrators to the point of stretching the system too thin?’13 He suggests parents
could respond to this daunting situation by donating a dollar a day to buy necessary
supplies for their children’s classrooms, thereby generating tens of millions of dollars
that would free teachers from scrounging for resources so that they could devote more
energy to improving educational quality. By taking this kind of personal responsibility
for problems, rather than asking for others to fix things, he explains we would have ‘no

Charles Reynolds, ‘Personal Responsibility Can Help us Overcome Budget Problems’ Examiner (3
February 2011) <http://www.examiner.com/article/personal-responsibility-can-help-us-overcome-budgetproblems> accessed 1 January 2015.
13
Reynolds (n 12).
12

Personal responsibility for systemic inequality

7

need for bailouts, welfare, or “stimulus packages”’.14 This rosy, fuzzy vision goes on to
bend personal responsibility into an oddly communitarian image of people ‘all act[ing]
together for the future of America’ removed from the ‘politicians who are only in it for
themselves’.15
This commentator’s message of personal responsibility for economic insecurity
reflects a US context where it has become normal policy for struggling public schools to
enlist schoolchildren as a sales force peddling products for fundraising businesses, or
for middle class parents to substitute homeschooling for inadequate public schools.
Health policy has taken a similar turn with policies supporting individual medical
savings accounts as a solution to inadequate health insurance. Given the erosion of
savings for many households, this home-grown approach to funding medical care more
often means that families of the seriously ill resort to community basket raffles,
spaghetti dinners, benefit concerts and other forms of glorified begging.
This superficially appealing vision of can-do neighborly energy, however, closes
off the possibility that ‘we’ could take back the responsibility and power of actually
governing our economy. The fact that it can seem more responsible and effective to lean
on similarly struggling neighbors rather than on government for basic social needs (such
as education or health care financing) reveals a moral and political vision of profound
passivity and submissiveness.
Speaking from a seemingly more centrist political position, National Public
Radio reporter Scott Horsley offered a similar personal responsibility message federal
budget debates in the post-crisis austerity climate.16 In contrast to the conservative

14

ibid.
ibid.
16
Scott Horsley, ‘Balancing the Budget: The Problem Might be You’ NPR News (Washington DC, 16
February 2011).
15
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blogger, Horsley directed his skepticism toward popular sentiment rather than toward
political leaders. Horsley noted polling evidence showing broad grassroots support for
federal government spending on roads and bridges, education and Medicare. But he did
not interpret this as evidence of principled agreement about the public value of
collective support for shared risks and investment. Instead, he presented this desire for
infrastructure and social spending as irrational and immature thinking, without denying
that the risks of crumbling bridges and roads, illness and inadequate or costly
educational opportunities require systemic rather than individual solutions. Nonetheless,
he disparaged voters for being unwilling to personally pay more for such enhanced
public protection, citing polling evidence of strong opposition to broadly applied tax
increases (such as gasoline taxes or highway tolls).
Noting this negative response to tax increases, Horsley argued that popular
sentiment has for too long pressured elected officials to ‘indulg[e] Americans’ desire for
services, without trying to collect’17, thereby leading to a $1.6 trillion deficit that he
portrays (without further explanation) as the overarching economic problem. His
answer: most Americans should take personal responsibility for bearing more costs,
either through individual tax increases or sacrifices in vital services. This rationale
develops the liberal ideal of autonomy for the post-crisis context of general economic
insecurity and loss. Though most of us face increased risk of pervasive harm beyond our
individual control, we nonetheless retain individual power and self-sufficiency to the
extent we bear the costs of addressing those harms ourselves, rather than spreading the
costs of protection and correction to others.

17

ibid.
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This view goes beyond the conservative writer’s message that responsibility
means replacing collective governmental action with individual charity. Outside the
overt right-wing, commentators like Horsley are likely to accept that government can
more effectively respond to widely shared needs such as health care and transportation
infrastructure. Yet they nonetheless tend to assume that this government support
requires that the presumed costs fall widely and heavily upon those struggling to stay in
or reach the middle class.
If we assume a context of general scarcity matched by a general obligation for
the costs of that scarcity, it can seem morally and economically justifiable to cut even
the most effective and popular social spending or regulatory protections. President
Obama’s 2012 budget comments rationalized cutting valuable programs for deserving
recipients as the necessary means to broad security in a time when personal and
governmental debt has produced systemic economic vulnerability. These examples
show how the more we assume innocent victimhood in the face of systemic inequality
and instability, the more it can seem that our best hope for reclaiming control and
security is to individually shoulder the burdens of that vulnerability. The most
responsible people then become those who limit their authority – whether as President,
workers, parents, or cancer patients unable to pay for health care – to bravely accepting
painful loss. The call to personal responsibility is grounded in a vision of deep and
pervasive powerlessness.
The chastening lesson presented by President Obama and echoed by Scott
Horsley erases the possibility that general austerity and sacrifice are not the only
solutions to widespread economic distress. Horsley misrepresents taxing and spending
policies, for example, by implying that the existing system normally and naturally

10

Political Economy and Law: A Handbook

distributes both protections and sacrifices evenly and rationally. He attributes the federal
deficit to the indulgence of ordinary Americans seeking personal or social benefits, not
(for example) to the previous decade’s tax cuts for the rich, or the staggering costs of
unpopular foreign military actions, or the recent decades of financial regulatory policies
designed to overlook potential instability and risk in favor of maximizing short term
gain to financial industry executives and investors. And his analysis assumes that
regressive tax policies are the only way to fund broad based social and economic
programs, ignoring President Obama’s efforts to revoke the previous administration’s
upper income tax cuts or to reverse the declining share of corporate taxation, or the lack
of serious discussion from either party about proposals to tax the kinds of speculative
financial gain that led to the recent economic crisis. Further, Horsley’s analysis assumes
that government spending on education, health and infrastructure drains rather than
produces public resources, implicitly denying the possibility that this spending is an
investment that will produce offsetting economic gain without tax hikes.
By foreclosing these possibilities, liberal or centrist rhetoric of personal sacrifice
paves the way for stronger attacks on government spending from the right-wing, such as
the emphasis on personal responsibility by Republican Congress Member and 2012
Vice Presidential candidate Paul Ryan in his prominent policy paper, ‘Roadmap for the
Future’.18 Ryan’s roadmap attributed economic instability and loss to excessive
government regulation, taxing and spending, rather than to the recent dismantling of
financial market controls and consumer protections. As the solution, the Roadmap
proposed substantial social spending cuts aimed at replacing government dependency

Representative Paul D. Ryan, ‘A Roadmap for America’s Future Version 2.0: A Plan to Solve
America’s Long Term Economic and Fiscal Crisis’ (January 2010)
<http://roadmap.republicans.budget.house.gov/> accessed 1 January 2015.
18
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with self-reliance.19 It reasoned that increased market pressure for sacrifice and hard
work would strengthen the economy by strengthening the American character.20

B. Solving specific failures through collective sacrifice
But why hasn’t the theme of personal responsibility for austerity led to new
policies demanding increased sacrifice and accountability from the financial industry at
the core of the global economic crisis? The financial crisis shed new light on
tremendous inequalities of privilege and power in the US, as a federal government
awash in financial industry largess responded with staggering industry bailouts outside
normal channels of control and accountability, while Wall Street bonuses and profits
grew to new heights. Ironically, popular cynicism about these inequalities has fueled
new political energy for popular sacrifice rather than for policies holding those at the
top responsible.

III.

Specific Power Masked by Systemic Harm
The contemporary construction of the crisis as a widely shared experience of

hardship and insecurity beyond individual control sweeps too broadly and
indiscriminately. This collective vulnerability is imagined to apply not just to workers,
families, small businesses, local governments and developing nations, but also to
multinational corporations and their executives and wealthy financiers, as well as to
Congress, the Federal Reserve, leading regulatory agencies and the U.S. Presidency. In
response to the recent economic crisis, the sense of broadly shared insecurity often
works to erase collective power more than to mobilize it. The neoliberal economic
19
20

ibid. 1, 14-15.
ibid. 13-15.
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narrative helps to construct solidarity in suffering as a natural failure of human
rationality and economic capacity rather than as a particularly unequal and intentional
appropriation of resources to support some at others’ expense.
For example, the 2011 report of the US government’s Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (FCIC) detailed, in hundreds of pages, the fraudulent activity of powerful
business leaders, but emphasized collective vulnerability rather than concentrated
power.21 The report acknowledges dramatic failure, stating that the FCIC’s mission was
to figure out ‘how the world’s strongest financial system came to the brink of
collapse’.22 It begins by describing staggering and widespread devastation, noting more
than 26 Americans out of work, nearly $11 trillion in household wealth lost, over 8
million homeowners in foreclosure or at risk of imminent foreclosure, businesses in
recession, and concluding that the ‘impacts of this crisis are likely to be felt for a
generation’.23 It emphasizes that such hardship and loss is happening to ‘[m]any people
who abided by all the rules’.24 Its opening overview takes a stance of shared shock,
humbly positioning the Commissioners on the same common ground of insecurity as
their fellow citizens, noting that ‘[l]ike so many Americans’ the Commissioners are
‘deeply affected’ and struggling to find answers in a confusing situation.25
The report uses this theme of mass vulnerability to gloss over conflict and
power. In fact, the Commissioners were not ordinary Americans caught off guard by
economic failure, but some of the major players in a long-developing, deeply contested
divide over economic policy and ideology. Chairman Phil Angelides, for example, was

21

US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (January 2011)
xvii –xxviii.
22
ibid.xvi.
23
Ibid. xv- xvi.
24
Ibid. xvi.
25
ibid. xvi.
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defeated in a bid for Governor of California in which he advocated tax hikes for the
very rich to fund expanded education. Democratic appointee Byron Georgiou has built a
career as a lawyer for organized labour, a proponent of tough safety regulation, and a
litigator representing investors in major financial fraud cases such as the Enron and
WorldCom scandals. Most famously in her former position leading the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Commissioner Brooksley Born made heroic and
outspoken efforts to regulate the derivatives market, correctly warning of their
destabilizing threat, but she was defeated in these efforts by the financial industry and
their free-market advocates, such as Larry Summers, Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan.
The report plays down this leadership and expertise, instead telling the story as if
the Commissioners were among those whose trust that the economy was the ‘world’s
strongest’ was suddenly and unpredictably shattered. By strategically avoiding this
controversy, the report sends an overriding message of inevitability and powerlessness
that weakens its stated conclusion that the crisis was avoidable.
Similarly, although the majority report’s summary blames free-market ideology
for undermining regulatory policies that could have avoided the crisis, it presents this
ideology as a fixed and mysterious external force without connection to particular
interests, institutions or agents. It seems accurate, as the report adheres, that there was a
widely accepted faith in an idealized self-correcting market which swayed leaders of
both parties in Congress and the Presidency, as well as experts in the Federal Reserve
and other government agencies.26 Nonetheless, a range of sophisticated competing
views were well-developed and vigorously argued by many intellectuals, political
leaders, regulators, and advocacy groups. Indeed, a competing orthodoxy had been

26

ibid. xviii.
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central to the longstanding New Deal policies enacted in response to the Great
Depression and only repealed in the late 1990s. The victory of deregulatory ideology
did not just happen by self-evident consensus or random historical change, but instead
required powerful, orchestrated and intentional action to discredit and defund these
opposing voices concerned about flawed economic assumptions (such as the warnings
from Born). The Democratic Commissioners could have identified themselves as part of
this opposition, using their own particular experience to probe more deeply into the
reasons this free-market fundamentalism was taken as a consensus or as objective and
sophisticated economic science rather than as a self-serving, contested and even corrupt
politics.
Because the report omits this story of conflicting ideology and interest, its
critique of deregulatory free-market ideology instead slides into a narrative of
generalized, blameless loss. Instead of analysing this free-market economic theory as a
well-honed instrument of powerful interests, it leaves the impression that political and
economic experts had little choice but to succumb to the dazzling laissez-faire vision
that just happened to come with lavish campaign contributions and prestige, and that
unpredictably facilitated vast inequalities, staggering risk, and extensive fraud.
Along the same line, the report concludes that the crisis resulted from
widespread regulatory failure and systemic bad management in the financial industry,
not simply from a few bad actors, a temporary or random blip, or a normal business
cycle. But it uses this theory of systemic failure to cover up controversy, skipping over
the exceptions to this bipartisan bandwagon, such as the CFTC’s regulatory efforts
under Born’s leadership. It also ignores the examples of strong, relatively successful
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regulatory action in response to financial instability in the US Savings and Loan Crisis27
or in other nations,28 as well as the relative soundness and success of many smaller
community banks.
It is true that the report seems to take a bold stand by insisting that regulators
were not powerless to stop the risky behaviour and impending meltdown, and by noting
that regulators actively chose not to exercise their power.29 The report also denies that
regulatory failure reflects inevitable human fallibility or greed, and instead emphasizes
that regulation is supposed to correct and prevent the failures of human rationality. It
even identifies the overwhelming power and money of the financial industry to corrupt
regulatory independence as a major problem.30 Nonetheless, by failing to discuss the
concrete efforts of regulators and critics to resist this power or the success of alternative
structures, it tends to reinforce the idea that this systemic failure represents universal
and inevitable irrationality rather than policies deliberately and carefully chosen to
privilege particular interests and ideologies.
Further, the majority report’s opening picture of shared hardship paints over the
enormous gains and overwhelming power exercised by some of the leading players in
the crisis. The report encourages sympathy for those suffering devastating losses,
deflecting right-wing efforts to minimize the harm or to scapegoat low-income or
minority homeowners or their advocates. Yet its summary omits any details about the
exceptions to this picture, such as the soaring profits and compensation earned in the
newly strengthened and consolidated financial firms, even as those firms were receiving
27

William K Black, Prepared Testimony of William K Black Before a Hearing of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Examining Lending Discrimination Practices and Foreclosure Abuses (7 March 2012)
27-35.
28
Carter Dougherty, ‘Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way’ NY Times (New York, 22 September
2008) C9.
29
FCIC (n 21) xviii.
30
ibid.
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massive bailouts. Moreover, the report’s summary extracts this widespread austerity
from the broader context of rising inequality over the last several decades, which
arguably set the stage for subprime lending through increased hardship among middle
and lower-income families and policies aimed to increase protection of lavish gains at
the top of the economic scale. Though its conclusions highlight the role of financial
industry mismanagement and fraud driven by incentives for short-term gain (e.g.,
executive compensation policies), the report’s summary nonetheless situates this failed
corporate governance as part of a broadly shared unwitting vulnerability. By omitting
details about these gains and the policies that have protected some so successfully, the
report leaves the impression that the executives, politicians and intellectuals who led the
charge for deregulation and financial risk-taking are likely to have suffered the
consequences of the resulting collapse along with unemployed workers, evicted
homeowners and struggling small businesses.
This picture of collective weakness rather than concentrated gain leads the report
to repeatedly dilute any particular responsibility for correcting and compensating the
harm. In attributing the crisis to speculative borrowing, risky investments and lack of
financial transparency, for example, the report states that both homeowners and leading
financial firms became ‘vulnerable’ to economic ruin when they ‘borrowed to the hilt’,
and it goes on to insist that the downturn in housing value ‘walloped’ homeowner and
financial firm alike31 – without mentioning the glaring difference in vulnerability
between those who lost their homes and life savings to foreclosure and the financial
executives (and their political protectors) who ran major financial firms into the ground
while typically retaining or even increasing their lavish incomes and assets, perhaps

31

ibid. xix-xx.
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even securing bailouts and buyouts that enhanced their failed firms’ market and political
power. Further, the report repeatedly describes this unrealistic speculation as a shared
borrowing spree, equating the high-risk borrowing and lending by the worlds’
wealthiest financial institutions with the excessive borrowing of ordinary homeowners
who took out mortgages without realistic hope of making even the initial interest
payments, much less covering the principle. The report’s summary does not explore
whether this tone of shared fallibility and misjudgment is contradicted by the report’s
showing of extensive one-sided financial firm fraud and intentional obfuscation selling
these mortgages to far less sophisticated buyers (or that these homeowners were likely
to be already struggling to pay off debt from uninsured medical costs, education and
falling wage income). Instead, it treats lack of transparency and risky borrowing as a
free-floating force divorced from the particular power of the sellers and financers of
subprime mortgages, so that the widespread panic and pain that ensued was universal
and fundamentally just, leading the report to conclude ‘we had reaped what we had
sown’.32
Although the report claims to reject the view that ‘everyone is at fault’ and
though it acknowledges that those at the top of finance and government had special
responsibility and power to avoid the crisis,33it quickly shifts responsibility to an
undifferentiated collective failure. The report concludes that ‘as a nation, we must
accept responsibility for what we permitted to occur. Collectively, but certainly not
unanimously, we acquiesced to or embraced a system, a set of policies and actions, that
gave rise to our present predicament’.34 As financial journalist William Greider points
out, the familiarly vacuous tone of the conclusion is matched by the report’s careful
32

ibid..xx.
ibid. xxiii.
34
ibid.
33
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ducking of responsibility for pinpointing the problem and its solutions, despite its
unique authority and expertise.35 The report avoids recommending strong and specific
action, such as prosecution of the rampant high-level fraud that the full report describes
in vivid detail. In response to Greider’s probing, Commission Chair Angelides insisted
that his job was only ‘to bring out the facts’,36 as if the occasion of a special commission
called simply for passive observation that might be handed over in full faith and
confidence to the very institutionalized regulatory processes whose systemic failure the
report detailed. Consistent with this stance of powerlessness and detachment, the
Commission repeatedly presents its findings of fraud and irresponsibility by those in
power as an unprecedented ‘tragedy’ rather than an outrageous injustice connected to a
broader struggle over legal and economic power.37 As a result, the Commission’s
majority constructs systemic failure as a rationale for acquiescing to increasing
inequality and hardship.
This perverse logic recognizes that insecurity and loss is structural and
pervasive, not a problem of individual responsibility concerning those suffering most.
But this reasoning proceeds to assume that those who suffer must nonetheless take
personal responsibility for bearing those systemic losses rather than acting collectively
to attribute blame or to seek redress from others. After all, ‘we’ are part of the system
that has failed. And, more subtly, this narrative suggests that because the problem was
the failure of powerful collective institutions, the solution requires avoiding collective
power struggles for systemic reform in favor of individual discipline and taking
35

William Greider, ‘FCIC Report Turns a Blind Eye to Wall Street Fraud’ The Nation (3 February 2011)
<http://www.thenation.com/article/158274/fcic-report-turns-blind-eye-wall-street-fraud> accessed 1
January 2015.
36
ibid..
37
Tavis Smiley, Interview with Phil Angelides, Tavis Smiley Show, PBS (14 February 2011)
<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/archive/201102/20110214_angelides.html> accessed 15 February
2011. Webpage no longer available.
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personal responsibility for starting anew. Echoing the Obama administration’s approach
to a number of national problems, the FCIC suggests we should eschew divisive and
distracting ideological conflicts over blame in favor of buckling down to the hard
individual work of moving forward under newly challenging conditions.

IV.

Collective Submission Reconstructed As Responsible Power
Despite this rhetoric of consensus and commonality, it is impossible for political

leaders to fully mask or dismiss the unequal power behind the current sense of pervasive
insecurity, especially given the blatant disparity between the bailouts for the financial
industry and the much more meager support or even increased austerity directed toward
most homeowners, workers, dependents, Main Street businesses and communities
suffering the effects of the crisis. A twist in the message of personal responsibility
suggests that when systems of mass austerity produce concentrations of extraordinary
privilege and luxury, we have all the more reason for personal surrender rather than
collective resistance. We must take personal responsibility for bearing the costs of those
who are too big to fail because appeasing their superior power is our best protection
against the mass insecurity and hardship their power generates.
This argument is a staple of neoliberal economic ideology and policy, and it
rests on an assumption that unequal power is fixed, natural and pre-political, largely
outside the reach of human agency and especially beyond law.38 Efforts to reform law to
‘intervene’ in this unequal power, even to help those whose hardship is the result of bad
luck or exploitation, are likely to backfire because those with more power will simply
use their superior resources to circumvent whatever restrictions or redistributive policies
Martha T McCluskey, ‘Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise’ (2007) 54
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are imposed on them, not only restoring or exceeding the original inequalities but also
wasting additional resources in the process. This theory rationalizes opposition to bank
regulations restricting exploitative and risky lending on the ground that banks will likely
respond by tightening credit overall or by raising interest rates.39 That result would
deepen the recession because productive businesses and responsible consumers would
have less access to affordable loans. Or, for another example, a proposal to hold rating
agencies liable for their evaluations of securities as a check on fraudulent or
irresponsible ratings was quickly withdrawn from Congress when rating agencies
responded by refusing to rate bond deals crucial to the teetering auto industry. 40
Most dramatically, the bailouts and subsidized government loans to Wall Street
have been justified on the ground that the financial firms are too powerful to be allowed
to suffer losses, regardless of their culpability for the disaster. The FCIC summarized its
mission as cutting through the emotional outrage against the financial bailouts to focus
on ‘how... it came to pass in 2008 that our nation was forced to choose between two
stark and painful alternatives – either risk the total collapse of our financial system.. or
inject trillions of taxpayer dollars...’41 The report gave blow by blow details about how
government leaders felt caught in this bind, spurred by AIG’s September 2008
unraveling after its ‘enormous sales’ of insufficiently funded credit default swaps
threatened to spill financial ruin on virtually every bank, financial firm and financial
product in a cascading series of failures throughout the global economy.42 Each time,
the only solution in view for regulators was to appease and cater to financial market
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‘confidence’, and to exacerbate the ‘too big to fail’ conundrum by consolidating failing
firms into even bigger and more powerful and precarious entities.43 The report
concludes by admitting that this process has created an economy more vulnerable to
irresponsible behemoths, heightening yet confounding demands for regulators to escape
this vicious cycle.44 This ending is particularly disconcerting given that the 2010 DoddFrank reform law largely punted on the regulatory details, which remain to be worked
out by regulatory agencies facing continuing pressure from an increasingly powerful
and profitable financial industry with legions of experts ready to work out the details in
their clients’ favor.45
Yet the report proceeds from this bleak and unsettled position not to detail the
controls and reforms that would be helpful, or even to note the competing sides in the
debate, but instead simply to further describe how largely innocent individuals are
bearing the pain of this crisis through business failures, job loss, government spending
cuts and foreclosures. Revealing the report’s refusal to connect the dots to reveal the
class conflict driving the facts, the only section of the report lacking a concluding
capsule analysis is the detailed final section on the ‘economic fallout’ that ends its
catalogue of disaster and austerity with a description of the record profits enjoyed by the
financial industry since the crisis, with 2009 profits triple those of three years earlier.46
The overall effect of the report reinforces the sense of inevitable capitulation to
overpowering exploitation – the very thing that the report’s mission was to challenge.
Its exhaustive efforts, though enormously revealing and potentially explosive, seem
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ultimately directed at exhausting and overwhelming rather than engaging and
mobilizing collective resistance by those left in the lurch. The Commission does not
describe any possible alternatives to the bailout, mergers and further regulatory buckpassing it presents, so that like all descriptions, it makes prescriptive choices and
assumptions covertly. Further, by shying away from the big picture, it cedes the bold
narrative of fault and solution to the Commission’s dissenters and other critics, who
have no qualms about skipping over factual detail or fanning flames to pin all manner of
responsibility on big liberal government and efforts to support the most economically
vulnerable homeowners.47
Rather than a struggle for meaningful regulatory control or for redress from
those whose enormous gains brought the crisis, the major political contest in the
aftermath of crisis appears to be over just how much increased pain must be imposed on
those who were largely innocent victims. Even under Democratic leadership, states
facing fiscal pressures seem politically unwilling to respond to deficits with policies
increasing taxes on the rich who gained from the crisis or reducing subsidies and tax
breaks for corporate interests – all out of fear that these measures will drive away
wealthy investors and taxpayers to leave workers and governments even more in debt.
In short, the mainstream picture of the crisis suggests that systemic vulnerability
demands systemic personal sacrifice from those who are most harmed, rather than
systemic reform. The vastly unequal power and privilege that protects those most
responsible for widespread suffering makes fearful servility seem the most responsible
option, on the theory that the best response is to appease those with superior power in
hopes that some crumbs will eventually trickle down. Systemic, pervasive vulnerability
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and loss, in this perverse logic, means that submission to inequality is not only natural,
but actually beneficial.

V.

Systemic failure excuses particularly powerful irresponsibility
Finally, by attributing the crisis to failures in a nebulous and overarching

‘system’, responsibility for costs not only appears to logically fall on the majority of
people, but also ironically appears to fall away from the institutions and individuals
whose irresponsible actions tended to produce the losses. Critics ask why ‘Wall Street
hasn’t gone to jail’ despite the extensive evidence that egregious fraud throughout the
financial industry led to the crisis. Given that theft of small amounts of money can lead
to incarceration for life in the US criminal justice system,48 the lack of criminal
prosecution of financial industry wrongdoing is striking.49 Civil fraud lawsuits confront
bankruptcy and trust laws that can help executives and owners of fraudulent subprime
lenders and their financiers shelter illicit gains from both their failing companies and
from the homeowners, investors and communities those companies harmed.50
Defending the glaring absence of personal responsibility in the recent crisis,
free-market advocacy groups and think tanks have been cautioning that emotional
reaction to increased hardship in the recent crisis might lead to ‘over-criminalization’ or
‘over-deterrence’ of corporations and their executives. The Manhattan Institute, for

cf Timothy Williams, ‘Sisters’ Prison Release is Tied to Kidney Donation’ NY Times, (30 December
2010)(reporting on special circumstances leading to release of two African American sisters serving life
sentences for participation in an $11 theft) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/31/us/31sisters.html?_r=0>
accessed 1 January 2015.
49
Matt Taibbi, ‘Why Isn’t Wall St. In Jail’ Rolling Stone (16 February 2011)
<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216> accessed 1 January
2015; Chris Arnold, ‘After Five Years, Why So Few Charges in Financial Crisis?’ NPR (26 July 2013)
<http://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205866019/few-on-wall-street-have-been-prosecuted-for-financialcrisis> accessed 1 January 2015.
50
Michael Hudson, The Monster: How a Gang of Predatory Lenders and Wall St. Bankers Fleeced
America –And Spawned a Global Crisis (Henry Holt 2010) 296.
48

24

Political Economy and Law: A Handbook

example, recently issued a paper criticizing corporate criminal liability, using as an
example the prosecution of accounting firm Arthur Anderson when a partner ordered
the destruction of potentially incriminating documents related to the government
investigation of Enron’s fraud.51 A jury verdict against Anderson was overturned by the
Supreme Court on the grounds of insufficient evidence of corporate consciousness of
wrongdoing, but by that time the firm had been dissolved. The Manhattan Institute
paper acknowledges the seriousness of this wrongdoing, but focuses on the particular
vulnerability of major corporations in criminal procedures due to their distinct role as
economic organizations. The paper warns that the legal and administrative costs of
defending against criminal investigations, for example, may be enough to make the
business unviable, even if the firm is ultimately found innocent, resulting in an effective
death penalty merely from being charged with a crime. It explains that corporations are
highly dependent on the trust and confidence of customers, clients, suppliers,
communities and creditors to survive, and that a mere indictment may be sufficient to
damage the company’s reputation so much that it cannot recover.52 In addition, it
emphasizes that corporations exist not for themselves (they have no self) but instead
represent the interests of employees and customers, so that a prosecution (deserved or
not) will end up hurting hosts of innocent people.53 Furthermore, the paper argues that
as complex organizations, major corporations cannot reasonably be expected to control
the actions of all their employees,54 so that criminal liability puts blame on executives
and investors victimized by the actions of innumerable potentially wayward
subordinates. Most importantly, the paper instead emphasizes that corporations are
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distinctly vulnerable and deserving of protection because criminalization shifts
corporate governance from executives to public officials, who can use what it describes
as pervasive fear of prosecution to extract concessions, directing the corporations’
power to social goals such as altering executive compensation practices or submitting to
extensive reporting requirements - or even donating to charity.55
Given the US criminal justice system’s harsh punishments and mass
incarceration directed at individual human beings (in a manner highly skewed by race
and class) and the extensive corporate power to influence both the civil and criminal
justice systems, it might seem difficult to construct corporations and their leading agents
or principals as distinctly fragile in the face of government power to hold wrongdoers
responsible. Even without conviction, criminal prosecution puts enormous costs on
human defendants (and their families and communities), many of whom may be wholly
innocent or who may similarly lack full control over their wrongful behaviour (due to
mental disability, addiction, youthful age and coercion or exploitation from family
members, gangs or pimps). Regardless of culpability, human individuals subject to
criminal prosecution may suffer long-term harm to jobs, assets and families and may
face enormous pressure to plead guilty to avoid the costs and uncertainties of a trial.
Despite the possible similarities to individual human defendants, the recent
critiques of corporate criminalization tend to construct the economic interests of
corporations and their executives as distinctly deserving of freedom from social
accountability and control. After all, a basic legal purpose of the corporate form is to
protect investors against personal responsibility for the potential economic harms of
their collective action, on the theory that this protection from risk will induce socially
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beneficial innovation, complex organization and vigorous growth – a ‘moral
opportunity’ rather than the increased carelessness and loss from protection typically
termed ‘moral hazard’.56
The Manhattan Institute paper develops this theory by contrasting the inevitably
compromised personalized and politicized interests of human prosecutors with the
purportedly impartial and benign purpose it attributes to the corporation. It strips down
the public institutional nature of courts to the biased judgment of private individuals,
while blurring the private economic interests of corporate executives and investors with
the collective well-being of workers, consumers, and communities likely to suffer
‘tremendous’ harmful impact when corporate gains are threatened.57 Further, it presents
criminal prosecution as an evasion of democratic politics, on the theory that criminal
prosecution results in government control without the participation afforded by the
normal regulatory process. By humanizing prosecutors as individual actors operating
outside legitimate politics and market, this analysis perversely makes subjecting
corporations to criminal liability a threat to the rule of law, rather than the fulfillment of
law’s promise to control power equally.
But even without culpability, those with great wealth might seem to have
particular responsibility for sharing their gains in the face of widespread devastation and
insecurity. Why shouldn’t the rich have a personal and social duty to bear much of the
costs of post-crisis austerity - through targeted increases in taxes, regulation, and
liability - given the recent message of personal responsibility regardless of fault?
Neoliberal economist Greg Mankiw defends the morality of policies protecting
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inequality in the face of great need by affirming philosopher Robert Nozick’s principle,
‘from each as they choose, to each as they are chosen’.58 For those to whom much has
been given, less is required in return by this logic because the gains of the very rich
appear as rewards bestowed by higher powers. Financial executives’ interest in
protecting their gains appears to be part of a complex and beneficial system, while
blameless individuals’ desire for public aid for home heating, safe workplaces or lifesustaining medicine seems to demonstrate an irresponsible refusal to sacrifice for those
whose greater success defines their greater worth.
In his popular video on the financial crisis, David Harvey asks why we should
want to live in a world where hedge fund managers can walk away from the global
financial meltdown with $3 billion in compensation while billions of humans face
increasing austerity.59 A conservative commentary responded by stripping the wealthy
executives of any individual moral agency, arguing that other people freely chose to pay
those hedge fund managers staggering riches because those hedge fund managers gave
something equally valuable in return.60 Wanting to take away that wealth to help those
suffering from their actions would be irrational in this view: ‘we’ asked for their
services through the market, so we are not playing fair when we want to take back the
gains we offered.

VI.

Reconnecting economic equality with law’s power
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This neoliberal logic of unequal personal responsibility for systemic harm builds
on a tradition of theory and policy defending equality by avoiding contentious questions
of individual control over harm. By separating the goal of compensation for
disadvantage from the goals of fault or deterrence, this tradition attempts to defend
welfare state programs against arguments that disadvantaged individuals have a
personal responsibility to prevent or mitigate their loss. Nonetheless, this rationale for
equality is undermined by the second strand of the personal responsibility argument.
The no-fault frame seems to make more harm deserving of redress, but at the same time
constructs this redress as individual need for special protection outside the normal
systems for rewarding productive action. If public support for disadvantage does not
appear to promote responsible economic and moral action, but instead simply
compensates for blameless bad luck or natural incapacity, then that support will appear
to divert resources from those more likely to enhance collective well-being. The
framing division between passive receipt of collective support and active production of
gain grounds neoliberalism’s overarching message that dividing resources to promote
equity risks undermining the goal of maximizing resources to promote overall welfare.
In a contemporary example of how the no-fault version of personal
responsibility undermines equality theories, legal scholar Daniel Markovits
painstakingly articulates a moral justification for limited ‘redistribution’ of collective
resources to those vulnerable to losses beyond their control.61 Drawing on principles of
‘luck egalitarianism’, he challenges the right-wing focus on personal responsibility as
the central moral argument against egalitarian policies. He argues that requiring people
to bear the costs of their own choices ignores that much inequality comes not from
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making bad choices as much as from having bad choices – making reasonable and
responsible choices among harmful alternatives - as a result of broader systemic
conditions. If we deny aid to those whose personal choices contributed to their loss, we
will therefore paradoxically violate the moral goal of tying aid to responsibility, because
those whose particularly bad luck gives them the least attractive options will appear to
be the most undeserving.62
This analysis seems to counter the foundational liberal ideal of autonomy with
an understanding that all individual choices are both limited and enabled by collective
political economic policies central to any resulting individual success or failure. Yet
Markovits instead retreats to further entrench the dichotomy between autonomous agent
and passive dependent, arguing for a tepid egalitarianism aimed more at excusing than
rectifying systemic inequality. In his view, harmful constraints on individual economic
success derive largely from random and natural bad luck out of normal human control,
and are therefore beyond legal and moral responsibility. Adopting a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance, his analysis presumes an economic system disengaged from politics, history
and morality so that constraints on individual choices appear natural and inevitable.
From this shrouded position, Markovits defines inequality as the problem created by
differences among individuals’ naturally endowed ‘talents’ and ‘tastes’, which in turn
produce unequal socioeconomic value.63
While this view recognizes that inequality can be unjust, it proceeds to make
robust equality a tragic impossibility. If we ‘redistribute’ luck-driven human capital to
enhance the choices of those less fortunate in talent and taste, we will diminish
resources going to more productive agents, thereby risking reduced overall capacity for
62
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responsible gain. Though equality goals could justify mitigating one person’s bad luck
in having ‘talents’ with relatively little market value (such as talents for elementary
school teaching, home health care or union organizing), Markovits cautions that this
support comes at the expense of others’ competing desires.64 By indulging one person’s
‘expensive tastes’ for raising children, for life-saving cancer treatment, for nontoxic air
and water, for effective transportation, higher education, safe neighborhoods and so
forth, we must necessarily reduce the good fortune of another whose highly valued
talent otherwise would allow indulging expensive tastes in (for instance) fancy cars,
mansions, political campaign contributions – or as the post-crisis response has
demonstrated, in amassing the economic and political power to defraud, dispossess, and
extract further sacrifices from others. Without evaluating the morality of the specific
economic context (which would require moving beyond consensus principles to
contested politics), we cannot value the possible economic ‘luck’ between people.
Markovits thus offers refuge in the seemingly less controversial normative decision to
generally favor productive socioeconomic agency over dependency by limiting
‘redistribution’ in the face of unequal human capital.65
From this superficially benign moral ground, Markovits reasons that collective
compensation for faultless inequality reasonably could be limited to the relatively small
amount of hypothetical insurance a disembodied individual in an abstract market would
purchase against bad luck in talent and taste. In this view, demanding full protection
against the risk of being a low-paid non-unionized elementary school teacher with an
expensive taste for raising a family would be irrational. The high ‘premium’ charged for
such protection would inevitably interfere with other potential tastes and talents, such as
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the power to become a lawyer talented in protecting lucrative corporate fraud from
taxes, punitive damages and criminal prosecution, or the power to satisfy a taste for
mass incarceration rather than for public education of impoverished youth.
These examples point to a gaping hole in the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, as well
as those similar theoretical frameworks that claim to limit equality in order to protect
personal choice in the face of systemic inequality. Markovits jumps from an abstract
assumption of scarce resources to the conclusion that collective support for equality is a
zero-sum game, inevitably requiring tough tradeoffs. In contrast, this analysis assumes
that public support for inequality lies outside those naturalized boundaries as a source of
beneficial growth. This conclusory logic presents a strikingly impotent view of the
agency it purports to celebrate because it assumes that we have no power or
responsibility to alter systemically unequal conditions of scarcity. More realistically, a
rational abstract person offered exorbitant insurance as the alternative to the high risk of
becoming a low-paid teacher without health insurance, collective bargaining rights and
job security might prefer to actively change or refuse this system rather than to
passively submit to its extortionate terms.
Glaringly absent from Markovits’ analysis, and from much liberal legal theory
of equality, is the idea that the power to control against harm is routinely and most
effectively exercised through political economic institutions, not just through
autonomous individual consumer exchanges in an abstract ‘market’. The collective
systems that enable or limit our choices are not the result of objective or passive
aggregation of isolated individual preferences or of an unmediated natural or
supernatural order. By emphasizing that responsible power necessarily operates through
collective protections, we can better challenge the false assumption of scarcity that
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makes unequal systemic harm a personal responsibility rather than a public injustice.
Markovits’ theory helps cover over pervasive legal and economic structures of unequal
collective risk-spreading– such as the corporate form in business – as presumptively
good and normal background conditions. That erasure enables beneficiaries of these
naturalized collective protections to appear to secure gains as productive individual
agents, while those rendered needy by structural disadvantage appear to be passive
‘patients’ demanding outside help.
Stripped of the arbitrary distinction between protection and production, the
moral arguments for sharply limiting government support for systemic harm lose their
logic. Collective protection from low wages, inadequate or unaffordable infrastructure,
child care, heat, nutrition, credit, medical care, clean air, transportation, pensions or
education can actually enhance overall societal well-being. Securing and benefiting
from that collective protection is just as much an expression and enhancement of free,
responsible, normal individual agency as accepting, protecting and legitimating the
structural privileges granted to certain ‘talents’ and ‘tastes’ under the current system.
The conceptual vocabulary, institutional frameworks and the members that make
up law and economics must scrutinize, rather than naturalize, the existing tough choices
in the face of scarcity, and more meaningfully address the glaring moral question why,
on the one hand, so much horrific and routine harm to so many is so cheap to inflict and,
on the other hand, why so much ‘talent’ or ‘taste’ for producing that harm gets so
lavishly rewarded. Such questions too often become silenced by legal and economic
arguments disguising irresponsible passivity toward systemic injustice with a pretense
of responsible neutrality.

